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Abstract
We provide three alternative characterizations of the proportional
solution deﬁned on compact and comprehensive bargaining problems
with claims that are not necessarily convex. One characterization re-
sult is obtained by using, together with other standard axioms, two
solidarity axioms. Another characterization theorem shows that the
single-valuedness axiom is dispensable even within the class of non-
convex problems if the standard symmetry axiom is imposed.
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Keywords: Bargaining problems, claims point, proportional solu-
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1 Introduction
By considering the class of bargaining problems (feasible utility sets) with
claims that are compact and comprehensive but not necessarily convex,w e
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1axiomatize the proportional solution in terms of solidarity.1 The aforemen-
tioned class, which was ﬁrst introduced by Chun and Thomson (1992), en-
riches the classical Nash (1950) bargaining domain by adding an unfeasible
point representing the claims of bargainers.2 The proportional rule, which
was also deﬁned and axiomatically studied by Chun and Thomson (1992),
assigns to bargainers payoﬀs proportional to their claims relative to the dis-
agreement point.
Nonconvex bargaining problems with claims are not unnatural. If agents
involved in some bargaining situation are not all expected utility maximiz-
ers, then the feasible utility set is not convexiﬁable by randomization. More-
over, randomization is not always reasonable or possible in all bargaining
situations. For instance, consider a principal-agent relationship with moral
hazard where preferences of the transacting parties are represented by von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions and their expectations (claims) have
utility values.3 The utility possibility set is not convex in general unless
random contracts are allowed [see, for example, Ross (1973)].4
The solidarity-type axioms are systematically studied by Xu and Yoshi-
hara (2008) for classical convex bargaining problems. In this paper, we pro-
pose two new axioms of solidarity for nonconvex problems with claims, by
which a new characterization of the proportional solution is provided. This
new result strengthens the characterization of Chun and Thomson (1992),
which was by means of a version of Kalai’s monotonicity axiom [Kalai (1977)].
The paper is organized as follows. First, we provide some basic notations
and deﬁnitions. Our axioms and results are laid down next. Finally, we
provide the independence of axioms.
1Noncovex bargaining problems have been considered for the three classical bargaining
solutions: Nash solution, Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, and Egalitarian solution (see, for
instance, Mariotti (1998, 1999), Xu and Yoshihara (2006), along with references cited
therein).
2For an excellent and easy introduction to the axiomatic bargaining theory, see, for
instance, Thomson (1994).
3Expectations may come from their experience and/or observation of related contracts.
4The utility surface is not convex because agents’ incentive constraints are not convex
in general.
22 Preliminaries
Let N = {1,...,n} be the set of agents with n = 2.F o r a l l x ∈ Rn
+ and
α ∈ R+,w ew r i t ey =( α;x−i) ∈ Rn
+ to mean that yi = α and yj = xj for
all j ∈ N\{i}.5 A positive aﬃne transformation is a function λ : Rn →
Rn such that there exist numbers ai ∈ R++ and bi ∈ R for each i ∈ N,
with λi (x)=aixi + bi for all x =( xi)i∈N ∈ Rn. The class of all positive
aﬃne transformations is denoted by Λ.F o ra l lS ⊆ Rn and any λ ∈ Λ,l e t
λ(S) ≡ {λ(x)| x ∈ S}.L e tπ be a permutation of N,a n dΠ be the set of





permutation of x.F o ra l lS ⊆ Rn and all π ∈ Π,l e tπ(S) ≡ {π(x)| x ∈ S}.
For all S ⊆ Rn, S is symmetric if S = π(S) for all π ∈ Π; S is comprehensive
if for all x,y ∈ Rn,[ x = y and x ∈ S]⇒ y ∈ S.6 For all x1,...,x k ∈ Rn,
let ch({x1,...,xk}) ≡ {y ∈ Rn|y 5 x for some x ∈ {x1,...,x k}} denote the
comprehensive hull of x1,...,xk ∈ Rn. For all i ∈ N,l e tei ∈ Rn
+ be the unit
vector with 1 in the i-th component, and 0 in all other components.
A n-person bargaining problem with claim (or simply a problem)i sat r i p l e
(S,d,c),w h e r eS is a subset of Rn
+, the disagreement outcome d ∈ S,a n dc is
ap o i n ti nRn
+ such that (i) S is compact and comprehensive, (ii) there exists
x ∈ S such that x>d , (iii) there exists p ∈ Rn
++ and r ∈ R such that for all
x ∈ S : p · x ≤ r,a n d( i v )c/ ∈ S, c ≥ d,a n dc 5 x(S)=( x1 (S),...,xn (S)),
where xi (S) ≡ max{xi|x ∈ S} for all i ∈ N if this maximum exists, otherwise
xi (S)=∞.
Let Σn be the class of all n-person problems. Given a problem (S,d,c) ∈
Σn and λ ∈ Λ,l e tλ(S,d,c) ≡ (λ(S),λ(d),λ(c)). Similarly, given a prob-
lem (S,d,c) ∈ Σn and π ∈ Π,l e tπ(S,d,c) ≡ (π(S),π(d),π(c)).L e t
WPO(S) ≡ {x ∈ S| ∀y ∈ Rn, y>x⇒ y/ ∈ S} be the set of weakly
Pareto optimal points of S. Similarly, let PO(S) ≡ {x ∈ S| ∀y ∈ Rn,
y ≥ x ⇒ y/ ∈ S} be the set of Pareto optimal points of S.
A (bargaining) solution with claims is a correspondence F : Σn ³ Rn
+
such that, for every (S,d,c) ∈ Σn, F (S,d,c) ⊆ S and x ≤ c for all x ∈
F (S,d,c).
Deﬁnition 1 A solution F over Σn is the proportional (bargaining) solution,
5Note that R is the set of all real numbers; R+ (respectively, R++) is the set of all non-
negative (respectively, positive) real numbers; Rn is the n-fold Cartesian product of R;
whilst Rn
+ (respectively, Rn
++) is the n-fold Cartesian product of R+ (respectively, R++).
6Given x,y ∈ Rn,w ew r i t ex = y to mean [xi = yi for all i ∈ N], x > y to mean [x = y
and x 6= y], and x>yto mean [xi >y i for all i ∈ N].
3denoted by FP,i ff o ra l l(S,d,c) ∈ Σn, F (S,d,c) consists of all maximal
points of S on the segment connecting d and c.
3A x i o m s a n d R e s u l t s
W ea r ei n t e r e s t e di nas o l u t i o nF that satisﬁes the following axioms, in the
statement of which (S,d,c) and (T,d,c) are arbitrary feasible elements of its
domain Σn:
Single Valuedness (SV). |F (S,d,c)| =1 .
Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO). For all x ∈ F (S,d,c), y>x⇒ y/ ∈ S.
Anonymity (AN). For all π ∈ Π, F (π(S,d,c)) = π(F (S,d,c)).
Symmetry (S). (S,d,c)=π(S,d,c) for all π ∈ Π ⇒[x ∈ F (S,d,c) ⇒
xi = xj for all i,j ∈ N].
Scale Invariance (SINV). For all λ ∈ Λ, F (λ(S,d,c)) = λ(F (S,d,c)).
Strong Monotonicity (SMON). S ⊆ T ⇒[∀y ∈ F (S,d,c), ∃x ∈ F (T,d,c)
s.t. x = y;a n d∀x ∈ F (T,d,c), ∃y ∈ F (S,d,c) s.t. x = y].
Contraction Independence other than Disagreement and Claims
(CIDC). S ⊆ T, F (T,d,c) ∩ S 6= ∅ ⇒ F (S,d,c)=S ∩ F (T,d,c).
Weak Contraction Independence other than Disagreement and
Claims (WCIDC). S ⊆ T, F (T,d,c) ∩ S 6= ∅,a n dF (T,d,c) ∩ S ⊆
PO(S) ⇒ F (S,d,c)=S ∩ F (T,d,c).
Expansion Independence other than Disagreement and Claims
(EIDC). S ⊆ T and F (S,d,c) ⊆ PO(T) ⇒ F (S,d,c)=F (T,d,c).
The ﬁrst seven axioms are standard. Note that (SMON) is a version
applied to possibly multi-valued bargaining solutions. If we restrict our at-
tention to single-valued solutions, then (SMON) is reduced to the standard
monotonicity axiom discussed by Chun and Thomson (1992).7
7For all (S,d,c),(T,d,c) ∈ Σn with S ⊆ T, F (S,d,c) 5 F (T,d,c).
4Note that (WCIDC) is a solidarity axiom, which requires that whenever
ap r o b l e m(T,d,c) shrinks to another problem (S,d,c), and there are so-
lutions to the problem (T,d,c) which are also Pareto optimal on (S,d,c),
then F(T,d,c) ∩ S should continue to be the only solution set of (S,d,c).
The solidarity idea embedded in this axiom is that, given that F(T,d,c)∩S
is Pareto optimal on (S,d,c), any movement away from F(T,d,c) ∩ S will
make at least one player worse oﬀ, and as a consequence, to keep the spirit
of solidarity, F(T,d,c)∩S should continue to be the solution set of (S,d,c).
(WCIDC) is slightly weaker than Nash’s original contraction independence
in that F (T,d,c) is required to be Pareto optimal on S.
Note that (EIDC) is another type of solidarity axiom, which requires
that whenever a problem (S,d,c) expands to another problem (T,d,c),a n d
all solutions to the problem (S,d,c) are Pareto optimal on (T,d,c),t h e n
F(T,d,c) should coincide with F (S,d,c). The solidarity idea embedded
in this axiom is that, given that any element in F(S,d,c) is still Pareto
optimal on (T,d,c), any movement away from it will hurt at least one player,
and so the solution set of this enlarged problem (T,d,c) should continue
to be F(S,d,c) by the spirit of solidarity. (EIDC) is a weaker formulation
of Independence of Undominating Alternatives suggested by Thomson and
Myerson (1980), which requires that F (S) to be weakly Pareto optimal on
T. However, (EIDC), combined with (SV), is stronger than Independence of
Irrelevant Expansions suggested by Thomson (1981).
Theorem 1. A solution F over Σn is the proportional solution FP if and
only if it satisﬁes (SV), (WPO), (AN), (WCIDC), (EIDC), and (SINV).
Proof. I tc a nb ee a s i l yc h e c k e dt h a ti fF = FP over Σn then it satisﬁes
(SV), (WPO), (AN), (WCIDC), (EIDC), and (SINV). Thus, we need only to
show that if a solution F over Σn satisﬁes (SV), (WPO), (AN), (WCIDC),
(EIDC), and (SINV), then it must be the proportional solution.
Let F satisfy (SV), (WPO), (AN), (WCIDC), (EIDC), and (SINV). Let
(S,d,c) ∈ Σn. Assume that {x} = FP (S,d,c). We will show that F (S,d,c)=
{x} holds. By (SINV), let {λ(x)} = F P (λ(S),0,1),w i t hλ(d) ≡ 0 and
λ(c) ≡ 1,f o rs o m eλ ∈ Λ. Clearly, λ(x) ∈ WPO(λ(S)) and λ(x) ≡
(α,...,α) ≤ 1. Assume, to the contrary, that λ(x) / ∈ F (λ(S),0,1).L e t
{y} = F (λ(S),0,1) by (SV). Let π(λ(S),0,1) be a permutation of (λ(S),0,1).
It follows from (AN) that F (π(λ(S),0,1)) = {π(y)} holds for all π ∈ Π.B y
(WPO), y ∈ WPO(λ(S)) and π(y) ∈ WPO(π(λ(S))) for all π ∈ Π.L e t
5us consider T ≡ ch({y,e1,...,en}). Then, (T,0,1) ∈ Σn and by (WCIDC),
{y} = F (T,0,1). Then, by (AN), {π(y)} = F (π(T,0,1)) for all π ∈ Π.
Now, deﬁne V ≡∪ π∈Ππ(T). Then, for all π ∈ Π, π(y) ∈ PO(V ).T h u s ,
by (EIDC), F (V,0,1)={π (y)|π ∈ Π}. However, since y is not a sym-
metric outcome, there exist π,π0 ∈ Π such that π(y) 6= π0 (y),w h i c hi sa
contradiction by (SV). Hence, {λ(x)} = F (λ(S),0,1), and (SINV) implies
{x} = F (S,d,c).
Deﬁning F as a single-valued solution, Chun and Thomson (1992) pro-
vided a characterization of the proportional solution in the domain of convex
problems by means of (WPO), (S), (SINV), and (SMON) formulated for
single-valued solutions. Note that this characterization still holds even if the
domain of problems is extended to nonconvex problems. By replacing the
monotonicity axiom discussed by Chun and Thomson (1992) with (CIDC),
we obtain an alternative characterization of the proportional solution.
Theorem 2. A solution F over Σn is the proportional solution FP if and
only if it satisﬁes (WPO), (S), (SINV), and (CIDC).
Proof. It is clear that if F = FP over Σn,t h e ni ts a t i s ﬁes (WPO), (S),
(SINV), and (CIDC). Next, we show that if F over Σn satisﬁes (WPO), (S),
(SINV), and (CIDC), then it must be the proportional solution.
Let F satisfy (WPO), (S), (SINV), and (CIDC). Let (S,d,c) ∈ Σn,a n d
assume that {x} = F P (S,d,c). We show that {x} = F (S,d,c). By (SINV),
let {λ(x)} = FP (λ(S),0,1) with λ(d) ≡ 0 and λ(c) ≡ 1 for some λ ∈ Λ.
Clearly, λ(x) ∈ WPO(λ(S)), and it is a symmetric outcome, i.e. λ(x) ≡
(α,...,α) ≤ 1.D e ﬁne the real number β as β ≡ max{xi (λ(S))|i ∈ N},
and the vectors yi =( β;α−i) for all i ∈ N.L e t T ≡ ch({y1,...,yn}),a n d
observe that λ(S) ⊆ T.B y d e ﬁnition of Σn, (T,0,1) ∈ Σn.S i n c e T is
symmetric, (T,0,1) is a symmetric problem. Thus, by (WPO) and (S),
F (T,0,1)={λ(x)}. It follows from (CIDC) that F (λ(S),0,1)={λ(x)},
so that F (S,d,c)={x} by (SINV).
Remark: In the above theorem, the axiom (CIDC) is indispensable, and
t h ew e a k e ra x i o m( W C I D C )i si n s u ﬃcient to characterize FP together with
(WPO), (S), and (SINV). In fact, as the following ﬁgure indicates, the situ-
ation that F (T,0,1)={x} and F (S,0,1)={y},w h e r eS ⊆ T,a n dT is
symmetric, is consistent with (WCIDC), but inconsistent with (CIDC).
Insert Figure around here.
6Thus, there exists a solution F 6= FP satisfying (WPO), (S), (SINV), and
(WCIDC), but not in case of (WPO), (S), (SINV), and (CIDC).
An interesting aspect of Theorem 2 is that it is obtained without impos-
ing (SV) on F. This property does no longer hold if (S) is replaced with
(AN). Thus, with the respect to the aforementioned characterization oﬀered
by Chun and Thomson (1992), another alternative characterization of the
proportional solution is obtained by replacing (S) with (AN) and by adding
(SV).
Theorem 3. A solution F over Σn is the proportional solution FP if and
only if it satisﬁes (SV), (WPO), (AN), (SINV), and (SMON).
Proof. It is clear that if F = FP over Σn,t h e ni ts a t i s ﬁes (SV), (WPO),
(AN), (SINV), and (SMON). Next we show that if F over Σn satisﬁes (SV),
(WPO), (AN), (SINV), and (SMON), then it must be the proportional solu-
tion.
Let F satisfy (SV), (WPO), (AN), (SINV), and (SMON). Let (S,d,c) ∈
Σn. Assume that {x} = FP (S,d,c). We show that F (S,d,c)={x}.B y
(SINV), let {λ(x)} = FP (λ(S),0,1) with λ(d) ≡ 0 and λ(c) ≡ 1 for some
λ ∈ Λ.C l e a r l y ,λ(x) ∈ WPO(λ(S)) and λ(x) ≡ (α,...,α) ≤ 1. Assume, to
the contrary, that λ(x) / ∈ F (λ(S),0,1).L e t{y} = F (λ(S),0,1),b y( S V ) .
(AN) implies that F (π(λ(S),0,1)) = {π(y)} for all π ∈ Π.M o r e o v e r , i t
follows from (WPO) that y ∈ WPO(λ(S)) and π(y) ∈ WPO(π(λ(S))) for
all π ∈ Π. Thus, we consider the following cases: (i) λ(x) ∈ PO(λ(S)) and
y ≤ λ(x), (ii) λ(x) ∈ PO(λ(S)) and y £ λ(x), (iii) λ(x) ∈ WPO(λ(S))
and y ≤ λ(x),a n d( i v )λ(x) ∈ WPO(λ(S)) and y £ λ(x).
Consider (i) or (iii). Then, for all π ∈ Π, π(y) ≤ λ(x).L e t T ≡
∩π∈Ππ(λ(S)). Obviously, (T,0,1) ∈ Σn.L e t F (T,0,1)={z} by (SV).
By (SMON) and (SV), z 5 (∧π∈Ππ(y)).8 By the property of permutation,
(∧π∈Ππ(y)) is a symmetric outcome. By the way, (∨π∈Ππ(y)) 5 λ(x).S i n c e
(∧π∈Ππ(y)) and (∨π∈Ππ(y)) are symmetric outcomes, but y is not a sym-
metric outcome, it follows that (∧π∈Ππ(y)) < (∨π∈Ππ(y)).T h u s ,z<λ(x),
and (WPO) implies that λ(x) / ∈ T, a contradiction.
Consider (ii) or (iv). We proceed according to whether y ≥ λ(x) or
[y ¤ λ(x) and y £ λ(x)].
8For all a,b ∈ Rn
+, a ∧ b =( m i n{ai,b i})i={1,...,n}, a ∨ b =( m a x{ai,b i})i={1,...,n}.
7Suppose y ≥ λ(x). Then, for all π ∈ Π, π(y) ≥ λ(x).O b s e r v e t h a t
(∧π∈Ππ(y)) = λ(x) < (∨π∈Ππ(y)).L e t T ≡∪ π∈Ππ(λ(S)),a n do b s e r v e
that (T,0,1) ∈ Σn.L e tF (T,0,1)={z},b y( S V ) .B y( S M O N )a n d( S V ) ,
π(y) 5 z for all π ∈ Π.T h i si m p l i e s(∨π∈Ππ(y)) 5 z.S i n c e(∨π∈Ππ(y)) is
a symmetric outcome and λ(x) ∈ WPO(π(λ(S))) for all π ∈ Π, it follows
that z/ ∈ π(λ(S)) for all π ∈ Π,s ot h a tz/ ∈ T, a contradiction.
Otherwise, consider y ¤ λ(x) and y £ λ(x). T h e n ,t h e r ei sa tl e a s t
one player i ∈ N such that yi < λi (x).T h u s , (∧π∈Ππ(y)) < λ(x).L e t
T ≡∩ π∈Ππ(λ(S)), and observe that (T,0,1) ∈ Σn.M o r e o v e r , l e t {z} =
F (T,0,1), by (SV). (SMON) and (SV) imply that z 5 (∧π∈Ππ(y)) < λ(x),
so that λ(x) / ∈ T by (WPO), a contradiction.
Hence, {λ(x)} = F (λ(S),0,1),a n ds o{x} = F (S,d,c) by (SINV).
4 Independence of Axioms
The axioms used in Theorems 1-3 are independent. To do this, let FLP :
Σn → Rn
+ be the lexicographic proportional solution deﬁned as usual. Given
λ ∈ [0,1],d e ﬁne the solution FλLP as FλLP (S,d,c) ≡ λ·FP (S,d,c)+(1− λ)·
FLP (S,d,c) for all (S,d,c) ∈ Σn.N o t e t h a t FλLP (S,d,c)=FP (S,d,c) if
and only if FP (S,d,c) is eﬃcient on S ∈ Σn.L e tΣn
sc be the set of all problems
in Σn each of which is also strictly comprehensive.9 Given λ ∈ (0,1),d e ﬁne
F as follows: for all (S,d,c) ∈ Σn,
(1) if (S,d,c) ∈ Σn
sc or S ≡ ch({x} ∪ {(ci;0−i)i ∈ N}) for some x ∈ Rn
+,
then F (S,d,c)=FP (S,d,c);
(2) otherwise, F (S,d,c)=FλLP (S,d,c).
Then, (WCIDC) and (CIDC) are indispensable, since F satisﬁes (SV),
(WPO), (S), (AN), (EIDC), and (SINV), but violates (WCIDC) and (CIDC);
(EIDC) is indispensable, since FLP satisﬁes (SV), (WPO), (AN), (WCIDC),
and (SINV), but violates (EIDC); (SMON) is indispensable, since FLP sat-
isﬁes (SV), (WPO), (AN), and (SINV), but violates (SMON); (SINV) is in-
dispensable, since the egalitarian solution FE satisﬁes (SV), (WPO), (AN),
(WCIDC), (EIDC), (S), (CIDC), and (SMON), but violates (SINV); (AN)
and (S) are indispensable, since the dictatorial solution satisﬁes (SV), (WPO),
(SINV), (CIDC), (WCIDC), (EIDC), and (SMON), but violates (AN) and
(S); (WPO) is indispensable, since a solution which always chooses d as
9S ⊆ Rn is strictly comprehensive if and only if for all x ∈ S, y ∈ Rn: x ≥ y ⇒[y ∈ S
and ∃z ∈ S such that z>y ].
8the solution outcome satisﬁes (SV), (AN), (S), (SINV), (WCIDC), (CIDC),
(EIDC), and (SMON), but violates (WPO).
Finally, for an example violating (SV), let F : Σn ³ Rn
+ be deﬁned for
all (S,d,c) ∈ Σn by:
(1) if PO(S)∩{x ∈ S|d<x≤ c} is non-empty, then F (S,d,c)=PO(S)∩
{x ∈ S|d<x≤ c};
(2) otherwise, F (S,d,c)=m a x s∈S{WPO(S) ∩ {x ∈ S|d<x≤ c}}.
It can be shown that F satisﬁes (WPO), (SINV), (SMON), (WCIDC), (EIDC),
and (AN), but it violates (SV). Thus, (SV) is indispensable.
5 References
Chun, Y., and W. Thomson (1992). “Bargaining problems with claims”,
Mathematical Social Science 24(1):1 9 - 3 3 .
Mariotti, M. (1998). “Nash bargaining theory when the number of alterna-
tives can be ﬁnite”, Social Choice and Welfare 15(3):4 1 3 - 4 2 1 .
Mariotti, M.(1999). “Fair bargains: distributive justice and Nash bargaining
theory”, Review of Economic Studies 66(3):7 3 3 - 4 1 .
Nash, J.F. (1950). “The bargaining problem”, Econometrica 18(2): 155-162.
Ross, S.A. (1973). “The economic theory of agency: The principal’s prob-
lem”, American Economic Review 63(2):1 3 4 - 1 3 9 .
Thomson, W. (1981). “Independence of irrelevant expansions”, International
Journal of Game Theory 10(2):1 0 7 - 1 1 4 .
Thomson, W. (1994). “Cooperative models of bargaining” in Handbook of
Game Theory with Economic Applications, edited by R.J. Aumann and S.
Hart, Vol. 2, Ch. 35: 1238-1284. Elsiever Science.
Thomson, W., and R.B. Myerson (1980). “Monotonicity and independence
axioms”, International Journal of Game Theory 9(1): 37-49.
Xu, Y., and N. Yoshihara (2006). “Alternative characterization of three bar-
gaining solutions for non convex problems,” Games and Economic Behavior
57(1): 86-92.
Xu, Y., and N. Yoshihara (2008). “The behavior of solutions to bargaining
problems on the basis of solidarity”, Japanese Economic Review 59(1):1 3 3 -
138.
9Yoshihara, N. (2003). “Characterizations of bargaining solutions in produc-














() { } ( ) { } ,  and  , FT x FS y == 0,1 0,1 . 